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COMMENTS
SHOULD PUBLIC EMPLOYERS BE FORCED TO
WARN THEIR EMPLOYEES OF THEIR
IMMUNITY AND DUTY TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
BEFORE DEMANDING ANSWERS AND
TAKING ADVERSE ACTION?
Matthew Bemt
On November 7, 1997, Edward Franklin was arrested in Evanston, Illi-
nois for possession of marijuana.' Franklin, a public employee, worked
for the Evanston Public Works Department.2 He was suspended by the
city, and later called in to discuss the arrest at a pre-disciplinary meeting.'
At the meeting, Franklin was asked about the incident without being in-
formed that any answers he gave could not be used against him in any
future criminal prosecution. Franklin refused to answer, citing his Fifth
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law. The author would like to thank Richard Ruda for his help and expertise, the staff
of the Catholic University Law Review for all their hard work, and Elizabeth Margeton for
her love, support, and encouragement.
1. Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838,841 (7th Cir. 2004).
2. Id. Franklin worked for the city as a "'Driver/Loader' in the Streets and Sanita-
tion Division of the Public Works Department" from 1975 until 1997. Franklin v. City of
Evanston, No. 99 C 8252, 2002 WL 31572137, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2002), rev'd in part,
2003 WL 1720006 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003), rev'd, 384 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2004).
3. Franklin, 384 F.3d at 841-42. Franklin was charged with misdemeanor possession.
Franklin, 2002 WL 31572137, at *1. News of Franklin's arrest was reported in the police
blotter section of the city's newspaper, and a coworker showed the article to Franklin's
boss. Id. In general, disciplinary proceedings, such as the one facing Franklin, have been
described as quasi-criminal. Helen Chun Parker, Note, Attorneys Who Plead the Fifth:
How the Self-Incrimination Provision Applies to New Jersey Attorney Disciplinary Proceed-
ings, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 493, 512 (1996).
4. See Franklin, 384 F.3d at 842. The situation Franklin and his employer faced is
not unique. See Peter Geier, Trumping 'the Fifth' Requires a Direct Order, DAILY REC.,
Feb. 1, 2002, at lB. Geier reported on a Maryland state appellate court decision regarding
a state correctional officer's five-day suspension for refusing to answer questions regarding
his off-duty behavior, including potential drug use. The Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals ruled that when employees are ordered to answer job-related questions, they can be
fired for refusing to answer by invoking their Fifth Amendment rights against compulsory
self-incrimination. Id. However, if an employee is not directly ordered to answer, he can-
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Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination; he also asked
to have the administrative proceedings delayed until resolution of any
6criminal matter. Franklin was subsequently fired by the city, in part for
his refusal to cooperate at the meeting.7
not be fired because any termination would not be for failing to answer, but for invoking
his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment. Id. For a similar situation, see
James G. Sotos, Fired Deputy Loses on 5th Amendment Claim, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb.
26, 1998, at 6 (describing a situation where a police officer was fired for refusing to give a
statement to an internal affairs investigator who was investigating the disappearance of
evidence from the evidence room). The officer was not warned that his statements could
not be used against him, but was told that he could remain silent. Sotos, supra, at 6. The
court ruled that the Garrity v. New Jersey line of cases did not apply because the statement
was not compelled or coerced. Id.; see also James G. Sotos, Prosecutor Not Liable for
Forcing Officer To Take Polygraph, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 7, 1994, at 6 (describing a
situation where four Baltimore City Police officers were involved in a shooting). In the
latter situation the officers were called to testify in front of a grand jury and warned that
they may have to take polygraph examinations, and were threatened with the loss of their
jobs if they refused to take the examinations. Id. The officers ultimately consented to the
examination, but later filed a civil rights action against the city citing the coercive nature of
the polygraph examination. Id. The Fourth Circuit ruled against the officers, saying there
was no Fifth Amendment concern because the results of the polygraph examination were
not used against the officers and the officers were not required to waive their Fifth
Amendment rights. See Wiley v. Mayor of Balt., 48 F.3d 773,777 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. Franklin, 384 F.3d at 842. Franklin also refused to answer at a previous meeting
with city officials, also without being warned. See id. at 841. The Fifth Amendment states:
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states by the
Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) ("We hold
today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the States."). The result
of Malloy is that "identical standards determine whether an individual's silence in either a
federal or state proceeding is justified." Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & James A. Wright, Employee
Refusals to Cooperate in Internal Investigations: "Into the Woods" with Employers, Courts,
and Labor Arbitrators, 56 MO. L. REV. 869, 873 (1991). The Fifth Amendment's protec-
tions also have been made applicable to administrative proceedings. See Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) ("[The privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judi-
cial, investigatory or adjudicatory."); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) ("The
privilege [against self-incrimination] is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the
proceeding in which the testimony is sought .... [i]t applies alike to civil and criminal
proceedings .... ). However, Hill and Wright note that the language of the Amendment
limits the application of Fifth Amendment rights to cases of criminal concern. Hill &
Wright, supra, at 873. Application to public employment situations is, according to Hill
and Wright, an "attenuated application." Id.
6. Franklin, 384 F.3d at 842.
7. See id. Franklin faced a situation where he was forced to choose between two
rights-the right to employment or the right against compulsory self-incrimination. Don-
ald Win. Driscoll, Note, Garrity v. New Jersey and its Progeny: How Lower Courts Are
Weakening the Strong Constitutional Protections Afforded Police Officers, 22 BUFF. PUB.
INT. L.J. 101, 138 (2003-2004). The choice made at the administrative proceeding to in-
voke the Fifth Amendment right or retain employment also affects the employee's rights
in the subsequent criminal proceeding. Id. Answering at the administrative level could
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Franklin brought a civil rights action against the city. 8 He alleged that
the city erred in failing to warn him that he could not invoke his Fifth
Amendment rights at the disciplinary meeting because his statements
would be immunized from use in any subsequent criminal prosecution.9
The district court found that Franklin was not adequately warned that he
had to answer because of the immunity attached to his answers.'0 The
Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the city, finding that
"Franklin was ... effectively forced to choose between his job and his
Fifth Amendment rights, and this was an impermissible violation."" The
court held that Franklin's firing was unconstitutional because the city
failed to warn Franklin.
12
The city petitioned for certiorari to decide the issue whether a warning
is required in a situation such as the one Franklin faced, asking that the
Supreme Court resolve a circuit split over this question." The city noted
that the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits do not require a warning,
and the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit requiring an affirmative warn-
ing. 14 However, the Court denied certiorari and left this split
land the employee in prison, while refusing to answer could lead to unemployment. Id. at
138-39. Thus, the employee in Franklin's position is unacceptably forced to choose be-
tween two important rights. See id.
8. Franklin, 384 F.3d at 842.
9. Franklin v. City of Evanston, No. 99 C 8252, 2002 WL 31572137, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 19, 2002), rev'd in part, 2003 WL 1720006 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003), rev'd, 384 F.3d 838
(7th Cir. 2004). It is interesting to note that the work rule prohibiting possession and use
of alcohol and drugs by city employees does not mandate an automatic removal from em-
ployment if the rule is violated. See id. at *2. At a due cause hearing on November 13,
1997, the due cause board found that Franklin violated the relevant work rule and "could
be terminated." Id. (emphasis added). In its decision, the district court noted that three
other employees were arrested for driving under the influence but were not fired. Id.
Franklin also noted that other employees "tested positive for drugs while at work, commit-
ted assault, and shot people and have retained their employment with Evanston." Id.
10. Id. at *5-6.
11. Franklin, 384 F.3d at 844.
12. Id. The warning that Franklin sought, and that the Seventh Circuit ruled was
missing, would have warned Franklin "that statements made during an investigation can-
not be used to incriminate [employees] in a later criminal proceeding when the employee
must choose between cooperation and termination." Kathleen A. Kedigh, Employee Mis-
conduct Investigations: Getting to the Truth Without Getting into Trouble, 61 J. Mo. B. 82,
83 (2005).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, City of Evanston v. Franklin, 544 U.S. 956
(2005) (No. 04-856), 2004 WL 2982819, *8. The question presented to the Supreme Court
by the city was: "Does the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment require a government em-
ployer to warn employees that they cannot refuse to answer questions during a disciplinary
proceeding relating to a criminal proceeding because the answers would be immunized?"
Id.
14. Id. at *9-10. The Seventh Circuit takes the approach that employees must be
warned explicitly of Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at *8. The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits do not require an explicit warning. Id. at *10.
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unresolved."
This Comment analyzes whether public employers have an affirmative
duty to warn public employees subject to administrative investigation
that they cannot refuse to answer narrow job-related questions when un-
der threat of removal because immunity from criminal prosecution exists.
This Comment first discusses the Supreme Court's development of the
law of coercion and coercive interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.
Next, this Comment discusses the Supreme Court's development of the
Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination as it ap-
plies to public employees by examining Garrity v. New Jersey and its
progeny. This Comment then addresses the question of whether employ-
ers must inform their employees of a grant of use immunity by looking at
how the courts of appeals have addressed the question.
This Comment then analyzes the benefits and detriments of the two
different positions that the courts of appeals have adopted. Finally, this
Comment will propose a rule mandating that an employer must provide a
warning of an employee's Fifth Amendment rights to an employee under
A number of state courts have also addressed the issue. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Blubaum,
560 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that police officers cannot be fired
for refusing to take a polygraph examination unless they are advised that their answers are
immunized from use in a criminal prosecution and that they will be asked questions only
about their duties); Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 710 P.2d 329, 330, 333 (Cal. 1985) (en
banc) (holding that under California law public employees must be advised of their consti-
tutional rights before they can be asked narrow questions relating to their performance on
the job and fired for refusing to answer those questions); United States v. Anderson, 450
A.2d 446, 461 (D.C. 1982) (holding that when a police officer, who has been informed that
he will not be prosecuted and is forced to answer questions on threat of his job, is subse-
quently indicted for that crime, any answers given after the officer has waived his Fifth
Amendment right cannot be used in the criminal prosecution); Kammerer v. Bd. of Fire &
Police Comm'rs of Lombard, 256 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Il1. 1970) (holding that the firing of a
police officer for refusing to answer narrow questions was valid because the officer had not
been required to waive his rights or immunity); Carney v. City of Springfield, 532 N.E.2d
631, 633-35 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the firing of a police officer under investigation for
violating narcotics laws, who did not understand his duty to answer or be fired, was invalid
because a general warning that the employee could be subject to departmental proceedings
was not sufficient to warn the employee of his duty to answer); State Dep't of Corr. Servs.
v. Gallagher, 334 N.W.2d 458, 462 (Neb. 1983) ("Public employees are not entitled to an
affirmative tender of immunity before they may be required to answer questions specifi-
cally, directly, and narrowly related to the performance of the employee's public duties.");
Gandy v. State ex rel. Div. of Investigation & Narcotics, 607 P.2d 581, 583-84 (Nev. 1980)
(holding that a public employee can be fired for refusing to take a polygraph examination
only after he or she has been informed that "the questions will relate specifically and nar-
rowly to the performance of his official duty; that the answers cannot be used against him
in any subsequent criminal prosecution, and that the penalty for refusing to answer is dis-
missal"); Debnam v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 432 S.E.2d 324, 330 (N.C. 1993) (holding that an
employer is not required to warn an employee that he has immunity and must answer
questions or be fired for his failure to answer potentially incriminating questions).
15. City of Evanston v. Franklin, 544 U.S. 956 (2005).
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investigation. This rule is workable and protective of employee rights,
while still allowing an employer to take necessary adverse employment
actions against an uncooperative employee.
I. FROM GARRITY TO A TWELL AND GULDEN: DEVELOPING THE
DOCTRINE OF USE IMMUNITY AND DETERMINING WHETHER
EMPLOYEES MUST BE MADE AWARE OF THAT IMMUNITY
A. Building a Foundation for Garrity: Pre-Garrity Decisions by the
Supreme Court Establishing the Parameters of the Fifth Amendment
The Supreme Court established the parameters of "coercion" under
the Fifth Amendment in a series of cases decided before 1967.16 Under
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the ultimate question regarding coercion
was "whether the accused was deprived of his 'free choice to admit, to
deny, or to refuse to answer' questions put to him or her. 7 Free choice
to answer can be abridged by both mental and physical coercion." Thus,
when individuals are under any coercive pressure they are unable to
make a free choice and the Fifth Amendment's protections should ap-
ply.19 The Court has said that the policy behind the Fifth Amendment is
16. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Lisenba
v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941). Hill and Wright note "that the privilege against
self-incrimination is related to the question of what safeguards are necessary to assure that
admissions or confessions are relatively trustworthy" and that confessions "are not the
product or fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth." Hill &
Wright, supra note 5, at 884-85.
17. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,496 (1967) (quoting Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 241).
In general, confessions must be given freely and voluntarily, and not be the product of
coercive behavior on the part of an investigator. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 542-43 (1897). The idea of voluntariness "encompasses all ... practices which are
likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and
rational choice." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-65. Courts must examine the circumstances
surrounding a confession to ensure the voluntariness of that confession and prevent false
confessions, thus preventing a criminal defendant from being convicted on the basis of
false evidence. See Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 236 ("The aim of the rule that a confession is
inadmissible unless it was voluntarily made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked
to determine whether the inducement to speak was such that there is a fair risk the confes-
sion is false."). Rationales for the general voluntariness test include deterring police from:
browbeating false confessions from suspects, engaging in conduct unbecoming of a civi-
lized society, engaging in general misconduct, engaging in tactics more suited to the in-
quisitorial system, and maintaining the will of a suspect. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme
Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 733, 749-50 (1987). While the voluntariness test remains good law, its use as the sole
method of testing the voluntariness of confessions was inadequate. See id. at 754-55.
18. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206.
19. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98. This idea of requiring a free and rational choice
comes from the Court's opinion in Miranda, where the Court announced the famous
Miranda warnings to protect criminal defendants. Id.
20071 1041
Catholic University Law Review
to prevent criminal suspects from having to choose between testifying
against their interests, lying and perjuring, or refusing to answer ques-
tions and being held in contempt of court.2°
Additionally, the Miranda Court rested its decision on the principle
that individuals must be allowed to invoke their rights under the Fifth
Amendment effectively for those rights to have any meaning or effect."
Miranda ultimately held that when criminal suspects are taken into cus-
tody and questioned, their right against compulsory self-incrimination is
placed in jeopardy.2 As a result, the Court found it necessary to institute
procedural safeguards in the form of a specific warning.2 The Miranda
warning assures that suspects are aware of their rights and opportunities
to remain silent.s The decision whether to talk rests solely with the sus-
pect, regardless of the social costs of such a rule.
B. Garrity and the Fifth Amendment's Application to Public Employees:
Applying the Court's Idea of Coercion in a Non-Criminal Setting
In a line of cases decided between 1967 and 1977, the Supreme Court
specifically defined the Fifth Amendment rights of public employees in
20. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. The Court in Murphy noted that the policy underlying
the Fifth Amendment requires a balance between the interests of both the state and the
individual. Id. By forcing individuals to give up their Fifth Amendment rights by incrimi-
nating themselves, the government defeats the purposes and policy supporting the Fifth
Amendment. See id.
21. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Garrity Court ultimately fashioned its rule on the
similar rationale of protecting public employees and preserving their ability to make "a
free and rational choice." See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497.
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
23. Id. at 478-79. The Court mandated that criminal suspects be given specific warn-
ings:
[W]e hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the
privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be
employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted
to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right
will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. The Court noted that confessions by criminal suspects remain a valid in-
vestigatory tool, but the decision to confess should be left to the suspect, and not as a result
of any coercive measures taken by the police. Id. at 478. Statements given by criminal
suspects, if they choose to confess, must be given freely and voluntarily after the appropri-
ate warnings have been given. Id. at 478-79. If these procedures are not followed, any
statement given by criminal suspects, no matter how valuable to an investigation, cannot
be used against suspects at their criminal trial. Id. at 479.
1042 [Vol. 56:1037
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the context of employer investigations.26 When public employers seek to
compel answers from employees by threatening their jobs or asking for
waivers of their rights, employees have automatic immunity from the use
of those answers in subsequent criminal prosecutions.27 Coercion is im-
plicit in such threats.2' Employee statements can be compelled only when
there is immunity and the questions are narrowly tailored to the em-
ployee's duties; immunity can be expressly granted or implied when ques-
tioning is coercive.
1. Garrity v. New Jersey: Establishing a Public Employee's Rights Un-
der the Fifth Amendment
Garrity v. New Jersey is the landmark case that established a public
employee's Fifth Amendment rights in the context of employer investiga-
tions of possible employee criminal conduct.3 Garrity involved police
officers who were under investigation for fixing traffic tickets.31 They
were brought in for questioning and informed that, pursuant to New Jer-
sey law, any statement they made could be used against them in a crimi-
nal proceeding, and that any refusal to answer questions would subject
them to removal. 2 Because they did not want to be fired, Garrity and the
26. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280, 284-85 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273,278-79 (1968); Garrity, 385 U.S. at
500.
27. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 805-06.
28. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 (holding that the threat of termination for refusal to an-
swer questions constitutes coercion, resulting in immunity from prosecution for any answer
given); see also Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278 (holding that an employer cannot fire an em-
ployee solely for refusing to waive his Fifth Amendment rights).
29. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278 ("If appellant... had refused to answer questions spe-
cifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without
being required to waive his immunity.., the privilege against self-incrimination would not
have been a bar to his dismissal." (footnote omitted)).
30. Driscoll, supra note 7, at 108, 110-11.
31. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494.
32. Id. The New Jersey statute in question in Garrity states:
Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive public office, position
or employment (whether state, county or municipal), who refuses to testify upon mat-
ters relating to the office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding wherein
he is a defendant or is called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, upon the
ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness
against himself or refuses to waive immunity when called by a grand jury to testify
thereon or who willfully refuses or fails to appear before any court, commission or
body of this state which has the right to inquire under oath upon matters relating to
the office, position or employment of such person or who, having been sworn, refuses
to testify or to answer any material question upon the ground that his answer may
tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself, shall, if holding
elective or public office, position or employment, be removed therefrom or shall
thereby forfeit his office, position or employment and any vested or future right of
2007] 1043
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other officers answered their employer's questions.33 Subsequently, the
officers' answers were used against them in their criminal trials.3 They
were found guilty and appealed the conviction on the grounds that their
statements given in the administrative interview were coerced because
they forced the officers to choose between their jobs and self-
incrimination."
The Court first found that the threat of removal for failure to answer
questions was coercive, comparing the choice the officers faced to being
"'between the rock and the whirlpool."'36 As to the admissibility of the
statements, the Court held that "the protection of the individual under
the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in
subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of
removal from office." 37 The result of Garrity was the exclusion from any
tenure or pension granted to him by any law of this state provided the inquiry relates
to a matter which occurred or arose within the preceding five years. Any person so
forfeiting his office, position or employment shall not thereafter be eligible for elec-
tion or appointment to any public office, position or employment in this state.
Id. at 494 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1
(Supp. 1965)).
33. Id. at 495.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 497-98. In a companion case, the Court said that the Fifth Amendment
protects against any penalty or sanction that forces the party asserting the right to make a
costly decision. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (citing Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 614 (1965)). In Spevack, the Court specifically held that threatening a lawyer
with disbarment constitutes coercion. Id. at 516. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Garrity,
noted that a statement or confession is coerced when the suspect's will has been overcome
either by "threats of imminent danger, physical deprivations, repeated or extended inter-
rogation, limits on access to counsel or friends, length and illegality of detention under
state law, individual weakness or incapacity, [or] the adequacy of warnings of constitu-
tional rights." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 505-06 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see
also Eleanor Heard, Are New York Police Officers Safely Playing or Playing it Safe?
Eliminating the Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 133, 136 (2000)
(noting that a police officer being questioned by a fellow officer after an incident faces an
inherently coercive situation that an average defendant would not necessarily find coer-
cive).
37. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. Administrative interrogations where an employee is
forced to choose between answering questions or being fired creates a conflict between the
employee's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, his property
right in continued employment with the government, and his due process right not to have
coerced statements used against him in a criminal proceeding. Driscoll, supra note 7, at
134. But see Gandy v. State ex rel Div. of Investigation & Narcotics, 607 P.2d 581, 583
(Nev. 1980) (showing the rule from Garrity does not mean those statements can never be
compelled, but may be obtained so long as immunity is given to those statements in both
federal and state criminal proceedings).
[Vol. 56:10371044
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subsequent prosecution of statements given when a public employee is
forced to choose between his job and his Fifth Amendment rights.38
2. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation and
Gardner v. Broderick: Explaining Garrity v. New Jersey
The year after Garrity was decided, the Supreme Court issued two
opinions clarifying Garrity.39 In Gardner v. Broderick, Robert Gardner, a
police officer, was called before a grand jury to answer questions regard-
ing unlawful gambling.4 Gardner was asked to waive his Fifth Amend-
ment rights before the grand jury, and was told that his failure to do so
would lead to his dismissal.41 Gardner refused to waive his rights and was
subsequently fired.
The Court found that Gardner's termination was a violation of his
rights under Garrity.4 However, the Court noted in dicta that answers
may be compelled if the employee is given immunity." Specifically, the
38. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. Precluding the use of statements made to one's employer
in a subsequent criminal proceeding is what protects the employee's Fifth Amendment
rights. Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 710 P.2d 329, 331 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). The
dissent in Garrity argued that the majority went too far by extending the privileges of the
Fifth Amendment beyond its purposes. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan argued that the majority's determination that the statements made by the
officers were both involuntary and inadmissible was incorrect. Id. at 501. Justice Harlan
reviewed the Court's past decisions regarding situations where the voluntariness of state-
ments were called into question, and determined that the officers' statements were not
involuntary. Id. at 505-06. Justice Harlan argued that the public policy considerations
were greater than any potential hazards to the officer's constitutional privileges, and there-
fore the statements given should be admissible. Id. at 506-09. Some scholars critical of
Garrity argue that the threat of termination should not trigger immunity. See Steven D.
Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1309, 1363 (2001). Professor Clymer, however, argues for immunity, stating that the
contrary view "overstates both the impediments to the government as an employer and the
advantages that government employees enjoy." Id. Significantly modifying or overturning
Garrity would allow public employers to "impose unique restrictions on public employees'
ability to exercise their Fifth Amendment rights." Id. at 1364.
39. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-
85 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276-79 (1968).
40. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 274-75.
43. Id. at 278-79.
44. Id. at 276; see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892) ("We are clearly
of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he
answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privi-
lege conferred by the Constitution of the United States."); see also Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (holding that the constitutional rule is that no witness in a
state trial may be compelled to give incriminating testimony for use in a federal proceeding
unless the appropriate immunity attaches to that statement, such that neither the state-
ment nor its fruits can be used in a later criminal proceeding).
2007] 1045
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Court said when an employee is asked questions that are narrowly and
specifically tailored to the scope of his employment, the employee can be
fired for failing to answer as long as his employer does not request a
waiver of an employee's immunity.45
In Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, the
Court was faced with the case of twelve New York Sanitation Depart-
ment employees who had been fired for invoking their Fifth Amendment
rights and refusing to answer questions about their conduct before the
sanitation commissioner; three other employees were fired for refusing to
waive immunity before a grand jury.4 The Court again noted that it was
not the questions, but the demand to waive the employees' Fifth
Amendment rights, that ran afoul of the Constitution and of Garrity.4
Repeating the limiting dicta from Gardner, the Court explained that pub-
45. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278. The privilege can be waived when the waiver is knowing
and voluntary. Id. at 276. Professor Byron Warnken argues that it is a misunderstanding
to read Garrity and Gardner as standing for the proposition that a law enforcement officer
"may be forced to choose between the constitutional privilege against compelled self-
incrimination and a career if the" employer only asks questions that are narrowly related
to the employee's performance while on the job. Byron L. Warnken, The Law Enforce-
ment Officers' Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 452,
480 (1987). Professor Warnken reads the Gardner dicta as "stand[ing] for the proposition
that if a law enforcement officer is granted immunity, but nonetheless refuses to answer
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official duties, the officer may be
dismissed." Id. Professor Warnken argues that in order to properly fire an employee
under Garrity and Gardner, public employers must provide immunity in exchange for
forcing an employee to answer questions related to their duty. Id.
46. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 282-83
(1968). The statute invalidated by the Court provided:
If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after lawful notice or
process, willfully refuse or fail to appear before any court or judge, any legislative
committee, or any officer, board or body authorized to conduct any hearing or in-
quiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify or to answer any question regarding
the property, government or affairs of the city or of any county included within its ter-
ritorial limits, or regarding the nomination, election, appointment or official conduct
of any officer or employee of the city or of any such county, on the ground that his an-
swer would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immunity from prosecu-
tion on account of any such matter in relation to which he may be asked to testify
upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or tenure of office or employment shall
terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible
to election or appointment to any office or employment under the city or any agency.
Id. at 282 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.Y. CITY, N.Y. CHARTER §
1123 (1966)).
47. Id. at 283-84. The Court in Uniformed Sanitation held that public employees had
been wrongfully fired because they had refused to waive their immunity. Id. at 283. Had
the city only required that the employees "answer questions specifically, directly, and
narrowly relating to the performance of their official duties on pain of dismissal from pub-
lic employment without requiring relinquishment of the benefits of the constitutional privi-
lege, and if they had refused to do so, this case would be entirely different." Id. at 284. If
this had been the case, the compulsion of testimony would not affect the employees' im-
munity. Id.
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lic employees who are not forced to abdicate their rights may be forced to
answer questions to account to the public for their behavior.48 The Court
has allowed public employees to be fired for failing to account for their
behavior because of their unique position in serving the public and the
need to keep public trust in the government high.49
3. Clarifying and Establishing the Rule of Garrity
In reviewing Garrity, Gardner, and Uniformed Sanitation, the Court
stated that a public employee may "refuse to answer unless and until he is
protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence
derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defen-
dant."5° In other words, because immunity is automatically granted to
coerced public employees, they can be compelled to answer and be fired
for refusing to answer narrow questions related to their official duties. 1
Statements given as a result of a threat are inadmissible and automati-
cally immunized. 2 Answers may be compelled if immunity has attached
via Garrity, there has been no attempt to coerce a public employee into
giving an answer, immunity has been waived, or Fifth Amendment rights
have been waived.53
48. Id. at 285.
49. Id. The Court noted that public employees "are subject ... to dismissal if they
refuse to account for their performance of the public trust." Id. at 285. However, this
rationale does not apply if the employer attempts to force their employee to give up their
Fifth Amendment rights. Gandy v. State ex rel. Div. of Investigation & Narcotics, 607 P.2d
581,583-84 (Nev. 1980).
50. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973); see also Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 442 (1972) (involving public employees who were called before a grand jury and
refused to answer the questions put to them). The Court in Kastigar ruled that the Fifth
Amendment only created immunity as to the statements, and not full immunity from crimi-
nal prosecution for the actions described in the compelled testimony. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at
461-62. In other words, the Court favors investigating wrongdoing on the part of public
employees, but only to the point where their constitutional rights are not infringed. See
Driscoll, supra note 7, at 119.
51. Turley, 414 U.S. at 79. In Turley, two architects licensed to work for the state
refused to waive their immunity before a grand jury and were disqualified from public
contracts. Id. at 75-76. The Court ruled that their dismissal violated their Fifth Amend-
ment rights under Garrity. See id. at 82-83.
52. Id. at 79.
53. See id. at 84-85. The Second Circuit offered an explanation as to why immunity
eliminated the protection against compulsory self-incrimination. It said:
To require a public body to continue to keep an officer or employee who refuses to
answer pertinent questions concerning his official conduct, although assured of pro-
tection against use of his answers or their fruits in any criminal prosecution, would
push the constitutional protection beyond its language, its history or any conceivable
purpose of the framers of the Bill of Rights.
Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 626 (2d Cir.
1970). Professor Warnken argues that dicta from Turley, Uniformed Sanitation, and Gard-
ner allows for a better understanding of three different levels of Fifth Amendment protec-
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In Cunningham, the Court further clarified the rule established in Gar-
rity.54 The Court first noted that it is not only the threat of imprisonment
or economic sanction that triggers Garrity immunity.5 Rather, coercion
can take any number of forms because it is compulsion that underlies the
56protections of the Fifth Amendment. The Court once again acknowl-
edged the tension between the need to maintain honest police officers
and civil servants, 57 and the need to respect the rights of public employ-
ees.
8
C. Lack of Consensus Regarding Affirmative Warnings: The Circuit Split
Garrity and its progeny left unanswered the question of whether public
employers must warn employees that they must answer questions put to
them by their employer when immunity is either expressly granted or
attaches due to the coercive nature of the questioning. The Seventh and
tion required before employers can fire their employees for refusing to answer questions.
Warnken, supra note 45, at 482. Those levels are "(1) a formal grant of immunity, (2)
Miranda-like warnings ... and (3) ... the assumption that the holding of Garrity will be
self-executing for the officer, providing an automatic immunity as a matter of law." Id.
Professor Warnken argues that the formal grant of immunity is the one intended by the
Supreme Court, but that lower courts have failed to understand these cases as requiring a
formal grant of use immunity. Id. at 483-84. The second option, according to Warnken, is
a middle ground approach that mirrors the rule adopted by the Seventh and Federal Cir-
cuits, requiring that employees be advised of their rights and the consequences of refusing
to answer narrowly-asked questions. Id. at 484-85. For a discussion of the Seventh and
Federal Circuit positions, see infra Part I.C.1. Finally, Professor Warnken disagrees with
the final interpretation because the employees have not been made aware of the immunity
to which they are entitled. Warnken, supra note 45, at 486-87. This is the position of the
Fifth Circuit. See infra Part I.C.2.
54. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977). In Cunningham, a political
party officer was removed from his office for failing to waive his immunity before a grand
jury. Id. at 802-04. The Court found his removal unconstitutional. See id. at 808-09.
55. Id. at 806.
56. Id. Donald Driscoll notes that the isolation surrounding a police officer under
investigation is especially coercive, as the officers will likely be abandoned by fellow offi-
cers who do not want to give the impression that an investigation into police malfeasance is
being compromised. Driscoll, supra note 7, at 107. Fellow officers are less likely to "pro-
tect their [fellow officers] or... respect the 'Thin Blue Line' or 'Code of Silence"' when a
police officer is under investigation for a shooting while on duty. Id.
57. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808. There is also the added interest of a municipality
whose employees have been accused of wrongdoing. Driscoll, supra note 7, at 108. A city
will fear not only the loss of faith in its institutions, but local politicians may fear losing
face over a local scandal. See id. In short, Supreme Court jurisprudence in the arena of
employer investigations "strikes a balance between the employee's privilege against self-
incrimination and the state's interest in getting an accounting from someone who holds a
public trust." Hill & Wright, supra note 5, at 885.
58. Hill & Wright, supra note 5, at 885.
59. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at *i (asking the Supreme Court
to specifically address the warning question).
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Federal Circuits require a warning, while the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits do not require such a warning.6°
1. Affirmative Duty to Advise: The Position of the Seventh and Federal
Circuits
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted Garrity and its progeny a number
61of times. In a recent case, the Seventh Circuit was presented with Sarah
Atwell, the director of development for the Lisle Park District, an Illinois
public entity.6' Atwell was under investigation for the misuse of park
district funds.63 Atwell's employer did not warn her of her duty to answer
its questions.64 Atwell invoked her Fifth Amendment right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination and refused to answer.65
The Seventh Circuit, as it has in each case in which it has dealt with
Garrity,66 ruled that the park district was required to warn Atwell of her
attached immunity and requirement to answer when threatened with re-
61moval. While acknowledging that the Fifth Amendment does not apply
60. See Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2002); Modrowski v.
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Hester v. City of Milledge-
ville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984). The Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have
explicitly left the question open. See Wiley v. Mayor of Bait., 48 F.3d 773, 777 n.7 (4th Cir.
1995) ("In an appropriate case, it might be necessary to inform an employee about [the
immunity's] nature and scope. Here, however, the need for an explanation did not ripen
because no officer attempted to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights ...." (citation omit-
ted)); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 7 and 8 v. United States, 40 F.3d 1096,
1102 n.5 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[T]his case does not require us to decide whether the govern-
ment must affirmatively advise a police officer who is undergoing an internal affairs inter-
view that the officer is not being forced to waive his or her Fifth Amendment rights .. ");
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 859 F.2d 276, 282 (3d Cir.
1988) ("[W]e find it unnecessary to decide whether a public employer must inform em-
ployees that use immunity attaches to questions relating to official duties, when the em-
ployee is required, on pain of dismissal, to answer the questions.").
61. See Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838, 844-45 (7th Cir. 2004); Atwell, 286
F.3d at 990; Riggins v. Walter, 279 F.3d 422, 430 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Devitt,
499 F.2d 135, 141 (7th Cir. 1974); Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891, 893-94
(7th Cir. 1973).
62. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 989.
63. Id.
64. Id. An investigator from the park district "told [Atwell] that a grand jury was
being convened to investigate the allegations and that, in light of the grand jury's involve-
ment, Atwell's lawyer would probably advise her that it would be prudent for her to exer-
cise her constitutional right to remain silent." Id.
65. Id.
66. See Riggins, 279 F.3d at 430; Devitt, 499 F.2d at 141; Conlisk, 489 F.2d at 893-94.
67. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990. The court in Atwell said, "because of the immunity to
which the cases [like Garrity] entitle him, [a public employee] may not refuse to answer the
questions on the ground that the answers may incriminate him." Id.; see also Riggins, 279
F.3d at 431 ("[Tlhis circuit requires that before taking disciplinary action, a public em-
ployer must inform the employee that any compelled statements could not be used in
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outside the criminal context, the court described its rule as an "anti-
mousetrapping" rule.6" It reasoned that employees are more likely to
have heard of their Fifth Amendment right than their rights under Gar-
rity and the immunity that attaches to their answers.6 As a result, em-
ployees subject to an investigation with their job on the line "may instinc-
tively 'take the Fifth' and" thus lose their jobs due to a lack of legal
knowledge.0
The Federal Circuit has also addressed this question, agreeing with the
Seventh Circuit.7 On one occasion, the Federal Circuit was presented
with a United States Housing and Urban Development (HUD) em-
ployee, Ruby Weston, who was under investigation for purchasing and
collecting insurance proceeds on a house that was sold by HUD.7 After
the United States attorney declined prosecution, a HUD investigator
attempted to question Weston.73 Before beginning the questioning, the
investigator informed Weston that there would be no criminal prosecu-
tion, that any information given was immune from use in any subsequent
criminal proceeding, and that a failure to answer could lead to her dis-
missal.74
criminal proceedings."); Devitt, 499 F.2d at 141 (stating that a witness may not be disci-
plined for failing to testify until he is told that his answers are immune from subsequent
use in a criminal trial); Conlisk, 489 F.2d at 895 (holding the discharge of police officers
unconstitutional because the officers were not told that their answers to administrative
questions could not be used against them). This rule is premised on the granting of immu-
nity either through an express grant or coercive questioning as described and developed in
the Garrity line of cases. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990.
68. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Modrowski v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Weston v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 948 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Supervisors in the federal
government often find themselves in a position where they must investigate minor wrong-
doing on the part of their employees. William N. Rudman, On the Hot Seat, GOV'T
EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1996, at 35, 35. In those situations, supervisors run a risk of interfering
with a criminal investigation if they do not first inquire as to the status of any criminal
investigation regarding that employee. Id. Managers need to make sure they respect the
Fifth Amendment rights of the employees they investigate. Id. at 35-36. The best way to
protect the rights of federal employees is to provide appropriate warnings. Id. at 36-38. A
failure to warn could lead to a reversal of any adverse action against the employee. Id. at
38. Finally, in the case where employees decide to cooperate with the investigation, man-
agers need to make sure that they preserve any answers for use in a future criminal prose-
cution. See id. at 36.
72. Weston, 724 F.2d at 945.
73. Id. at 945-46.
74. Id. By relying on the Garrity doctrine, the court quickly determined Weston's
Fifth Amendment claim, stating, "there is no question that Ms. Weston's refusal [at a
meeting with a HUD investigator] and subsequently to participate in the proposed investi-
gation was not justifiable out of any valid [F]ifth [A]mendment considerations." Id. at 948.
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After citing Garrity and its progeny approvingly, the court stated that
under the Fifth Amendment, an employee must be "duly advised of his
options to answer under the immunity granted or remain silent and face
dismissal" in order for a dismissal of an employee to be valid." In Wes-
ton's case, the court found the statement read to Weston was sufficient to
duly advise her of her rights and consequences under the Fifth Amend-
ment.76
The Federal Circuit refined its understanding of the affirmative duty to
warn rule in Modrowski v. Department of Veterans Affairs.7 In Mod-
rowski, the Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA) investigated Mod-
78rowski for stealing items from two government-owned houses. During
75. Id. at 948 (citing Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1393). In Kalkines, the Bureau of Customs
suspended and ultimately discharged an employee for failure to answer questions pertain-
ing to an administrative investigation. Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1391-92. The court, relying on
Garrity and Uniformed Sanitation, ruled the discharge invalid. Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1396,
1398 (holding that Kalkines had not been adequately told of his duty to answer and of the
consequences of not answering the questions put to him).
76. Weston, 724 F.2d at 948.
77. Modrowski v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The
Federal Circuit's position has been adopted by the Merit Systems Protection Board in Sher
v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 97 M.S.P.R. (West) 232, 237-38 (Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. 2004). In
Sher, the Merit Systems Protection Board was faced with a federal employee suspected of
taking an unauthorized gift. Id. at 234. Prior to an administrative interview, the employee
was notified that the United States attorney had declined prosecution, that the matter was
solely administrative, and that he was required to answer. Id. at 236-37. Despite an addi-
tional letter granting immunity from the United States attorney, the employee refused to
answer questions. Id. at 237. The board discussed both Weston and Modrowski, adopted
the general test, and found the case to be more like Weston than Modrowski. Id. at 237-39.
The issue was also discussed by a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board in
Bucknor v. U.S. Postal Service, 93 M.S.P.R. (West) 271, 275-76 (Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. 2003)
(Slavet, Member, separate opinion). In Bucknor, Bucknor damaged a Postal Service vehi-
cle while using it for personal use. Id. at 274. When questioned about the incident,
Bucknor refused to answer without an attorney present. Id. After obtaining counsel,
Bucknor answered the agency's questions. Id. Upon completion of their investigation, the
agency "proposed removal for the unauthorized use of a government vehicle and impeding
the subsequent Postal Service investigation by refusing to answer the agency officials'
questions." Id. The penalty was later reduced to a suspension. Id. Bucknor appealed and
the board affirmed the punishment. Id. at 271-72 (board decision). In a separate opinion,
Board Member Slavet discussed Fifth Amendment concerns noting that an employee has a
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to make statements he reasonably believes may be used
against him in a criminal trial. Id. at 275 (Slavet, Member, separate opinion). However, if
the employer has warned the employee that refusing to answer could lead to removal and
that any statement given can not be used because of the immunity that attaches under
Garrity, then the employee must answer any questions posed. Id. Member Slavet noted
that if there is no overt threat of removal, then Garrity does not apply and an employee
may invoke his Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 275-76. In Bucknor's case, he was never
informed that he could be fired for refusing to answer, thus Garrity should not have ap-
plied and Bucknor was entitled to remain silent so long as he reasonably believed his an-
swers could later be used against him. Id. at 276.
78. Modrowski, 252 F.3d at 1346-47.
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the course of its investigation, the VA discovered that Modrowski sold
two VA-owned houses in violation of VA regulations.79 A VA officer
questioned Modrowski, who refused to answer." The VA notified the
United States attorney's office of the investigation, but the United States
attorney declined to press charges related to the sale of the houses.8 The
VA notified Modrowski that he had been granted immunity for the sale
of the houses, that there would be no prosecution forthcoming, and that
he was required to answer administrative questions.82 Modrowski contin-
ued to refuse to answer questions and was subsequently terminated.3
The court distinguished the case from Weston by noting that the letter
of immunity was ambiguous in both scope and in the VA's ability to
speak for the United States attorney, unlike the grant of immunity in
Weston.84 The court found that Modrowski was reasonable in his appre-
hension that his responses could be used against him in a later criminal
proceeding for the theft from VA-owned houses.8n Based on Weston and
Modrowski, the Federal Circuit agrees with the Seventh Circuit, but adds
the stipulation that the grant of immunity cannot lead to unreasonable
apprehension regarding its scope.86
Finally, the Second Circuit has implied in dictum that based on the Su-
preme Court's rulings in Garrity and Uniformed Sanitation, warnings are
required before adverse employment action can be taken.Y7 After the
Supreme Court's decision in Uniformed Sanitation, an Environmental
Protection Agency deputy administrator questioned the fifteen New
York Sanitation Department employees who were the subject of the
case. 8 They were warned that they had a right to remain silent, that fail-
79. Id. at 1347.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The grant of immunity and letter from the VA said nothing about the thefts.
Id.
83. Id. at 1348.
84. Id. at 1352-53. Unlike in Weston, the grant of immunity in Modrowski did not
state whether it covered one or both of the crimes, and the grant of immunity was written
on VA letterhead rather than letterhead from the United States Attorney's Office. Id. at
1351. Thus, the court found that Modrowski could not be certain whether the immunity
covered him for one or both of the crimes for which he was under investigation, and he
could not be certain as to the trustworthiness of the grant of immunity. Id. at 1352.
85. Id. at 1351-52.
86. See Weston v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 947-48 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("[The privilege] protect[s] against any disclosure[s] that an individual reasonably
believes could be used in his own criminal prosecution .... ).
87. Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2002). For the original facts
of the case, see Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280,
282-83 (1968).
88. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 621 (2d
Cir. 1970).
1052 [Vol. 56:1037
Should Public Employers Be Forced To Warn
ure to answer could lead to adverse action, and that answers could not be
used in criminal proceedings.89 The employees refused to answer and
were subsequently fired from their jobs for a second time.90
The Second Circuit found that the city had adequately followed the
rule laid down in Gardner v. Broderick, and held that the removal of the
sanitation employees was valid.91 In dicta, the court implied that proper
proceedings were required before adverse action could be taken.92 It de-
fined proper proceedings as those "in which the employee is asked only
pertinent questions about the performance of his duties and is duly ad-
vised of his options and the consequences of his choice." 93
2. No Duty to Warn: The Position of the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits
The Fifth Circuit has held that employers need not warn their employ-
ees of their duty to answer questions.94 In Gulden v. McCorkle, the Dal-
las Public Works Department asked employees Charles Gulden and
Richard Sage to take polygraph examinations. 9 Gulden and Sage refused
on the grounds that the department was illegally attempting to obtain a
waiver of their rights by threatening their jobs. 96 Based on their refusal,
Gulden and Sage were discharged from their positions with the depart-
ment.97
The court first discussed the Garrity line of cases.98 It summarized the
Garrity line as follows:
[T]hese cases emphasize [that] it is the compelled answer in com-
bination with the compelled waiver of immunity that creates the
Hobson's choice for the employee. It is a discharge predicated on
the employee's refusal to waive immunity which is forbidden by
[Garrity and its progeny], not a discharge based on refusal to an-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 621-22.
91. See id. at 627.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court found that the statement read by the Sanitation Department, essen-
tially copying language from Garrity, Uniformed Sanitation, and Gardner, was sufficient to
advise the employees of their rights. Cf id. at 621, 627.
94. See Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070, 1076 (5th Cir. 1982). It is important to
note that although the Fifth and Seventh Circuits disagree as to the warning requirement,
they are in agreement "that there can be no duty to warn until the employee is" presented
with questions narrowly related to his duties. See Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987,
991 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that there is no duty to warn until the employee is asked ques-
tions that are narrowly and specifically directed to his duties).
95. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1071.
96. Id. at 1071-72.
97. Id. at 1071.
98. Id. at 1073-74.
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swer where there is no demand by the employer of the relin-
quishment of the constitutional right.99
The court declined to accept the argument that Garrity and its progeny
require "an affirmative tende'r of immunity."' The court reiterated that
it is the compulsion of testimony, not the failure to require the employee
give an affirmative waiver, that creates the constitutional violation.'
Consequently, the court found that the department did not require Gul-
den and Sage to waive their immunity.' 2 The court reasoned that forcing
an employer to offer an affirmative tender of immunity or a warning
prior to any questioning would allow an employee to exercise a right
when the need to do so had not yet ripened.'03 The court noted that a
duty to warn could only exist after an employee was forced to answer
narrow, direct questions about his or her employment, though the court
doubted such a duty was required by Garrity.'04 Requiring a warning
would frustrate investigations by public employers who had not yet com-
mitted a constitutional violation.'5 The court implied that warning an
employee prior to any questioning would not give the employer an op-
portunity to ask necessary questions of the employee, thus impermissibly
tilting the balance in favor of the employee over the need to preserve the
public trust.°6
In Arrington v. County of Dallas, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that the
Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination does
not apply until an employer requests relinquishment of an employee's
rights.' 7 Only compelling an answer to incriminating questions and com-
99. Id. at 1074 (emphasis omitted).
100. Id. at 1075.
101. Id. The court found that failure to give immunity is not the same as compelling a
waiver of Garrity immunity. Id.; see also Harrison v. Wille, 132 F.3d 679, 683 (11th Cir.
1998) (finding, similarly to the Fifth Circuit, that an employee must show that his employer
compelled him to give up his Fifth Amendment rights before he can be granted relief for
his firing). Thus, an employee who could not show that he was fired solely for remaining
silent in the face of questioning by his employer was not granted relief for his firing. Harri-
son, 132 F.3d at 683.
102. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1076.
103. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that Gulden and Sage had not yet been required to
answer narrow and specific questions about their duties, only that they were required to
take polygraph examinations. Id
104. Id.
105. Id. Recall that the Fifth Circuit read Garrity to hold that the constitutional viola-
tion does not occur until illegitimate questions or a coerced waiver of rights have been
asked of the employee, not before any questioning has been initiated by the employer. Id.
at 1075-76.
106. Id. at 1076; see also Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426
F.2d 619, 625 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that public employees should account for the public
trust placed in them as public employees).
107. Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1446 (5th Cir. 1992). In Arrington,
Constable Jack Richardson approached two deputy officers, Floyd Arrington and Timothy
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pelling a waiver of Garrity immunity places an employee's rights in jeop-
ardy."' According to the Fifth Circuit, simply refusing to tender immu-
nity affirmatively or to warn an employee of the consequences of the en-
counter is not sufficient to constitute a Fifth Amendment violation.' 9
The Eleventh Circuit proposed another reason for adopting the same
rule in Hester v. City of Milledgeville."0 There, the Eleventh Circuit
found that a public employer's failure to tender a timely offer of immu-
nity is irrelevant in a coercive situation."' The court reasoned that Gar-
rity immunity attached when a statement has been compelled in any112
way. Thus, the court found that any affirmative tender of immunity
would be "duplicative" because the employees were already granted use
immunity under Garrity and its progeny.113 The Eleventh Circuit thus
adopted the rule that Garrity immunity attaches when the employees are
subjected to improper coercive questioning.14  An explicit warning is
therefore unnecessary.115
The Eighth Circuit has agreed with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.
116
In Hill v. Johnson, a sheriff's department terminated an employee, Hill,
who refused to answer questions and take a polygraph examination re-
garding missing evidence."7 The court found that the Fifth Amendment
Hammond, to assist in his reelection bid. Id. at 1443. Both Arrington and Hammond
declined the offer. Id. After Richardson had been reelected, Arrington and Hammond
claimed "they were treated less favorably than were the [other officers] who had supported
the [Richardson election bid]." Id. Arrington and Hammond also discovered records that
Richardson had improperly used official files for political purposes, and that Richardson
was actively spying on Hammond. Id. Arrington and Hammond kept the files, and
Richardson later accused them of stealing the files. Id. Richardson fired Arrington for
allegedly refusing to cooperate with an investigation into the stolen files. Id. Hammond
was also fired for possession of the stolen files. Id.
108. Id. at 1446.
109. Id.
110. Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).
111. See id. at 1496. In Hester, the city of Milledgeville was concerned with drug use
among the city's firefighters. Id. at 1494. The city authorized mandatory polygraph testing
that was narrowly tailored to protect employees' Fifth Amendment rights. Id. Before
questioning, each employee signed a waiver that provided the employees with the choice
to authorize their answers for later use, waive their rights, retain their rights, or refuse to
submit to the polygraph (and face dismissal). Id. The firefighters filed suit, claiming that
the waiver policy violated their Fifth Amendment rights. Id.
112. Id. at 1496.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Benjamin v. City of Montgomery, 785 F.2d 959, 962 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating
that public employees should not be forced to speculate as to whether their statements are
covered by the immunity offered in Garrity); see also Debnam v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 432
S.E.2d 324, 330-31 (N.C. 1993) (adopting the rationale of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in
analyzing the issue of affirmative warnings).
116. See Hill v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 469,471 (8th Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 470.
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was not violated because Hill was not required to waive his Fifth
Amendment rights to answer questions related to his job."' According to
the court, the failure to offer immunity differs from an "attempt to com-
pel a waiver of immunity."" 9 The court based this rule on the premise
that a compelled waiver does not follow from a mere failure to ade-
quately warn or offer immunity, even if the employee is otherwise un-
aware that his answers are immune from further use.2°
The dissent in Hill found fault in the rule that no affirmative warning or
grant of immunity is required."' The dissent argued that without an af-
firmative warning, "a public employer could discharge an employee for
refusing to answer a question as long as there was no explicit request for
a waiver [of immunity], irrespective of whether the employee knew of the
nature of the proceeding."'22 According to the dissent, the majority's rule
is a result of reading Uniformed Sanitation and Gardner too narrowly.
1 3
This could allow employers to incompletely describe the nature of the
investigatory interview to employees.24 The assertion by employers that
the interview was only administrative in nature could surprise employees
who feared that the questioning would turn into a criminal investiga-
tion.1 2'
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY To WARN AND THE No DUTY To
WARN RULES
Courts requiring a warning cite the need to inform an employee of his
rights against anything being used in a subsequent criminal proceeding,
the need to protect employees from making decisions not in their best
interests, and the need to keep employers honest during administrative
investigations.'26 Courts that reject a warning requirement note the du-
plicative nature of such a warning, the need to hold public employees
accountable to the public trust, and the need to allow employers to inves-
tigate employees in violation of the law or regulations.2 7 The rule requir-
118. Id. at 471.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 472 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("The heart of my disagreement with the
majority lies principally in its statement that a mere failure affirmatively to offer immunity
is not an impermissible attempt to compel a waiver of immunity..
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 473. The dissent stated that "[a]bsent a requirement that the employee's
rights be clearly communicated, a public employer . . . will be free to characterize any
proceeding where it seeks to compel statements as 'administrative' after the employee has
been fired, and avoid the rights of public employees laid out by the Supreme Court." Id.
125. See id. at 472-73.
126. See supra Part I.C.1.
127. See supra Part I.C.2.
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ing a warning and the rule not requiring a warning have benefits and dis-
advantages that will be discussed below.
A. Benefits of the Seventh and Federal Circuits' Rule Requiring a Warning
First, the rule requiring a warning is clear in principle and is clear pro-
ceduraly. The rule simply is "that the [public] employer who wants to
ask an employee potentially incriminating questions must first warn him
that because of the immunity to which the cases entitle him, he may not
refuse to answer the questions.
129
Although the court in Atwell characterizes it as a bright-line rule, the
cases from the Second and Federal Circuits show that the rule can be
applied using a variety of methods.30 In Uniformed Sanitation, the Sec-
ond Circuit stated in dicta that employees must be informed of their
rights and the consequences of invoking those rights. 3 1 While the court
found it important that the employee be given warnings, it did not dictate
the specific language of those warnings. Instead, Atwell afforded pro-
tection against unknowingly waiving Fifth Amendment protections by
requiring that warnings be given before questions are asked.33 The re-
quirement to warn is balanced by the implicit latitude given to employers
in their method of conveying the warning. 34
Additionally, the requirement that employers must give affirmative
warnings does not preclude their ability to take appropriate administra-
tive action, including termination if the proper safeguards are in place."'
128. See Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2002).
129. Id. The requirement for these warnings was affirmed in Franklin v. City of Evans-
ton, 384 F.3d 838, 843-44, 848 (7th Cir. 2004), which noted that Franklin's firing "was a
violation of Franklin's right[s because the city] ... skirted the need for Atwell warnings."
130. See Weston v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 948 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (allowing a statement read by a HUD investigator to serve as sufficient warning);
Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 625, 627 (2d Cir.
1970) (stating that an employee must be duly advised of his choice).
131. Uniformed Sanitation, 426 F.2d at 627.
132. See id. (noting that employees must only be warned of their option to answer
narrow and direct questions and the consequences of that choice); see also Atwell, 286 F.3d
at 990 (requiring only that warnings be given, and not requiring any specific language);
Weston, 724 F.2d at 948 (requiring the same procedure described in Uniformed Sanitation);
Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (requiring only that the em-
ployee be duly advised of his rights and the consequences thereof).
133. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990.
134. See Weston, 724 F.2d at 948 (allowing a statement read by a HUD investigator
describing Weston's rights to serve as sufficient warning). But see Modrowski v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding a letter written on depart-
ment letterhead claiming authorities had decided not to prosecute and conferring immu-
nity served as inadequate warning when the scope and validity of the grant was reasonably
suspicious to the employee).
135. Gandy v. State ex rel Div. of Investigation & Narcotics, 607 P.2d 581, 583 (Nev.
1980); see also Atwell, 286 F.3d at 991 (stating that only when employees are properly
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The warning requirement thus strikes a balance between the employee's
need for protection and the employer's desire to obtain information and
136take adverse action when necessary.
The need for warnings is made clear by the fact that lower courts have
eroded away the protections afforded under the Garrity rule.37 This
places public employees precisely in the situation the Court in Garrity
found objectionable by forcing employees to choose between their rights
and their jobs.'38 Requiring affirmative warnings prevents employees
from answering questions against their interest and helps to uphold the
rule established in Garrity39 The result is that an employee will not be
forced to speculate what their rights are because they will be properly
informed and fully protected by Garrity.
B. Disadvantages of the Seventh and Federal Circuits' Rule
The first disadvantage of the warning requirement is that warning em-
ployees of their rights may lead to their refusal to talk and subsequent
141termination. Although employers will be able to fire offending em-
ployees, their investigations will be incomplete. The employer will be
able to punish an offending employee, but will not be able to determine
advised of their rights can an employer take action); Weston, 724 F.2d at 948 (holding that
the dismissal of a federal employee for refusing to answer questions when she had properly
been advised of her rights and duties was valid).
136. See Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990-91 (noting that public employers have a right to dismiss
employees who break the law or do not answer narrowly asked questions, but that right
must be balanced by warning employees that immunity attaches to their statements).
137. Driscoll, supra note 7, at 119 ("Federal and state courts have continued to allow
statements made by accused officers to be 'used' tangentially, to spur investigations, pre-
pare for prosecution, and plan trial strategy.").
138. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967); see also Driscoll, supra note 7,
at 140 (arguing that a police officer questioned by his employer faces one of the most
stressful situations of his life, and may be forced to choose between his rights and his job).
139. Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 710 P.2d 329, 334 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (Bird,
C.J., concurring); Driscoll, supra note 7, at 140.
140. Hill v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1998) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing
in favor of the Seventh Circuit's rule because it does not force employees to guess their
rights); Lybarger, 710 P.2d at 336 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (arguing that police officers
under investigation should not be required to speculate as to the status of their constitu-
tional rights).
141. See Modrowski v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Sher v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 97 M.S.P.R. (West) 232, 236-37 (Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.
2004). Both Modrowski and Sher were informed of their rights and refused to talk, leading
to adverse actions against them. See Modrowski, 252 F.3d at 1347-48; Sher, 97 M.S.P.R.
(West) at 234, 236-37.
142. Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070, 1076 (5th Cir. 1982).
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the cause of that behavior due to a lack of information. Requiring a
warning could stunt a criminal investigation before it begins.144 Once an
employee is warned that he has immunity and must answer questions or
be fired, an employee can either talk and protect his job or remain silent
and be fired.'45 All answers given are immunized from further use in the
criminal process.'6 Any prosecutor wishing to take further action against
the employee must then act without the use of those statements.17 All
information given during the administrative interview will be off limits in
any future criminal prosecution.'
The chilling of administrative or criminal investigations weakens public
trust in municipal agencies. 149 Citizens expect transparent public institu-
tions and government; 50 when public employees are given warnings and
143. See Andrew M. Herzig, Note, To Serve and Yet To Be Protected: The Unconstitu-
tional Use of Coerced Statements in Subsequent Criminal Proceedings Against Law En-
forcement Officers, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 401,440-41(1993).
144. Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1076; see also Robert M. Myers, Code of Silence: Police Shoot-
ings and the Right To Remain Silent, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497,517 (1996) ("When
these compelled statements are taken at the beginning of the administrative investigation,
any potential criminal prosecution will likely be very difficult to pursue."); Heard, supra
note 36, at 144 (arguing that administrative and criminal investigations of police conduct
overlap because: the conduct could be both against department regulations and criminal,
the first investigators on the scene are police officers whose questions about criminal con-
duct could also be part of an administrative investigation, and the information gained
would be automatically deemed coercive and unavailable in any criminal proceeding).
145. Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2002). The implication of
the Seventh Circuit's position is that employees should answer rather than remain silent
against their interests. See id.
146. See Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1985); see also
Kate E. Bloch, Police Officers Accused of Crime: Prosecutorial and Fifth Amendment Risks
Posed by Police-Elicited "Use Immunized" Statements, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 625, 629 (1992)
(noting that when a police department's internal investigation unit questions an officer
regarding his duties, any statements made are immunized before the prosecutor even hears
of the incident because the internal "investigation may transpire behind closed doors").
147. Clymer, supra note 38, at 1312. Prosecutors are at a disadvantage in incidents
involving police misconduct because only internal police investigators will ask questions of
those involved. Id. Officers are made aware that there are significant penalties, including
termination, for refusing to cooperate. Id. Officers will more readily cooperate with the
internal investigation, rendering their statements inaccessible to prosecutors. See id. The
restriction on the use of immunized statements is "more troublesome in prosecutions of
police officers" because internal police investigators are more likely to take a compelled
statement than other public employees. Id. at 1328.
148. Id. at 1320-21. As Professor Clymer points out, "[ilf investigators, prosecutors, or
witnesses have learned the contents of a compelled statement, that burden can create
difficult or even insurmountable impediments to criminal prosecution." Id. at 1312. The
burden is high because there are greater restrictions placed on the use of compelled state-
ments taken from police officers in non-custodial situations than coerced statements taken
from criminal suspects in custodial situations. Id. at 1313.
149. See Myers, supra note 144, at 518-21 (discussing the need for police investigations
to be open in order to preserve the ideal of open government and trust in public officials).
150. See id. at 519-20.
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subsequent immunity, public accountability is reduced in the interest of
protecting individual employees.' The result is that courts must uphold
the rights of a few individual employees by reducing the deterrent of
criminal prosecution for any malfeasance.
C. Advantages of the Fifth Circuit's Rule
The Fifth Circuit's position eliminates the need to choose individual
rights over public trust by not requiring a warning.'53 This rule supports
employers who seek to retain the public's trust by never requiring an em-
ployer to affirmatively warn an employee of his rights before answering
questions.'" The Fifth Circuit has held that a constitutional violation
does not occur until an employee is forced to answer questions and is
forced to waive his immunity regarding those statements.' A forced
waiver of immunity is independent of the requirement that employees
answer questions or be fired."" This position allows employers to ask
questions and remove employees for refusing to answer when they have
not yet violated an employee's constitutional rights.5 5 The result is that
both public trust and employee's rights are preserved while giving the
employer maximum latitude to operate.' 58
151. Id. at 518-19; see Hill v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1998) (arguing that
there is great public interest in securing the public trust by having public employees ac-
count for their performance by allowing termination for refusal to answer narrow and
direct questions put to them by their employer); see also Heard, supra note 36, at 148-49
(arguing that the New York City "forty-eight hour rule" creates the negative impression
with the public that the police are actively seeking to cover-up police misconduct and "re-
ceive special treatment under the law").
152. See Hill, 160 F.3d at 471; Myers, supra note 144, at 521. Professor Clymer looks at
relevant appellate court decisions and notes "that Garrity immunity can, and does, result in
dismissals, lost convictions, and suppression of critical evidence." Clymer, supra note 38,
at 1338-39. Immunity may prevent prosecutors from charging individuals whose state-
ments have been immunized. Id. at 1339. Finally, Garrity immunity can prevent prosecu-
tors from calling relevant and important witnesses. Id.
153. See Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1446 (5th Cir. 1992). Professor
Clymer makes apparent the need to maintain public trust, noting that police officers, inves-
tigators, and witnesses could use the system created by Garrity to sabotage and undermine
any criminal investigation. Clymer, supra note 38, at 1360.
154. See Hill, 160 F.3d at 471.
155. Arrington, 970 F.2d at 1446.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see also Hill, 160 F.3d at 471 ("As long as a public employer does not demand
that the public employee relinquish the employee's constitutional immunity from prosecu-
tion ... the employee can be required to either testify about performance of official duties
or to forfeit employment.").
158. See Hill, 160 F.3d at 471; Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 710 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal.
1985) (en banc). There is a strong public policy argument in protecting the public, in mak-
ing sure public institutions are not corrupt, and in making sure any damaging behavior is
not repeated. See Parker, supra note 3, at 519 (noting that the system for disciplining at-
torneys in New Jersey relies on similar Fifth Amendment arguments as those in the realm
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D. Disadvantages of the Fifth Circuit's Rule
The Fifth Circuit's position places public employees at a disadvantage
to their employers. ' " As a result, because there is no violation until a
waiver of immunity is requested, problems arise when it is unclear
whether there has been such a request.'60 The dual needs of keeping an
employee certain of his rights and preventing him from making an ill-
advised choice are reasons to require a warning;161 the Court's intent in
Garrity was not to leave an employee in such a position.'62
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit's rule does not preserve future criminal
prosecutions any more than the Seventh Circuit's rule.'63 Garrity immu-
nity attaches whenever an employee is forced to answer questions under
threat of dismissal, regardless of whether he is informed of his rights or
not.'64 Because the immunity attaches when answers are forced, the in-
formation is useless to prosecutors whether or not warnings are given. '
The burden on the prosecution if it wishes to use the information is the
same in either case. 66 There is little advantage to the prosecutor, and
thus the public, in failing to give wamings.'67 Even if more statements
of public employees and therefore helps to protect the public, purifies the bar, and pre-
vents repetitious action).
159. See Hill, 160 F.3d at 473 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see also Clymer, supra note 38, at
1362 (noting that while there is a need to effectively prosecute offending public employees,
that rationale alone should not be the basis for diluting their Fifth Amendment rights).
160. Hill, 160 F.3d at 473 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see also Lybarger, 710 P.2d at 336
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (claiming that the logic of Gardner v. Broderick is that employees
should not be left guessing what their rights are during an investigation or interrogation).
161. Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2002); Hill, 160 F.3d at 473
(Heaney, J., dissenting).
162. Hill, 160 F.3d at 473 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The Hill dissent claims that such a
rule reads Garrity and its progeny too narrowly. Id. at 472. Professor Warnken agrees
with the Hill dissent's position with respect to law enforcement officers, stating:
Under this overly broad reading of Garrity, the officer does not have a right to assert
a fifth amendment privilege, and the authorities are within their discretion to dismiss
the officer .... [tihus, instead of applying Garrity [and its] progeny to vindicate the
fifth amendment rights of law enforcement officers, courts have applied those cases to
sanction yet another generation of constitutional infringement.
Warnken, supra note 45, at 488.
163. Cf Clymer, supra note 38, at 1312 (noting that any compelled statement, whether
the employee is warned or not, cannot be used by a district attorney without overcoming
substantial hurdles).
164. See Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990.
165. Clymer, supra note 38, at 1312 (noting that when an internal affairs unit questions
police officers, the officers' statements are immunized as soon as those statements have
been compelled).
166. See id. at 1326. "The prosecution can satisfy its burden by showing that witnesses,
investigators, and prosecutors have not been exposed to the immunized testimony, either
directly by reading it, or indirectly by otherwise learning of it." Id.
167. See id. at 1312. To successfully prosecute an officer who has given an immunized
statement, prosecutors must show that they have made no use, either directly or indirectly,
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could be used by the prosecutor under the Fifth Circuit's rule, routine
admittance may deter cooperation by an employee under investigation.
'68
Not only will prosecutors be harmed by the Fifth Circuit's rule, but
failure to give warnings also will have a negative impact on internal inves-
tigations. 69 There is a strong public interest in maintaining the integrity
of public institutions and punishing those employees responsible for mal-
feasance.171 When an employer questions an employee about job-related
duties, the employer is seeking information to discover and resolve exist-
ing problems.7 ' A failure to warn may lead employees to invoke the
Fifth Amendment, thus depriving their employer of any valuable infor-
mation that would help in an internal investigation.1
Finally, even in circuits in which there is no requirement that warnings
be given, precedent requires courts to examine whether there was a con-
stitutional violation.7 The Fifth Circuit rule requires a factual examina-
tion by the court to determine whether a violation occurred, while the
Seventh Circuit's rule requires only a determination of whether a warning
174was given.
of the officer's statement. Id. Additionally, failure to give warnings goes against the state-
ment in Garrity that public employees are entitled to full constitutional rights. Herzig,
supra note 143, at 441 (pointing out that police officers are entitled to all rights afforded
them under the Fifth Amendment regardless of the severity of their transgressions).
168. Herzig, supra note 143, at 440 ("If Garrity statements are routinely admitted into
grand jury hearings ... officers would stop giving statements as a matter of course.").
169. See generally id. at 440-41.
170. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-
85 (1968) (noting that public employees should be subject to dismissal for violations of the
public trust); Herzig, supra note 143, at 441.
171. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 628
(2d Cir. 1970).
172. See Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2002); Uniformed Sanita-
tion, 426 F.2d at 628.
173. See Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1446 (5th Cir. 1992). Arrington
states that a constitutional violation occurs when an employee is compelled to answer
incriminating questions and is compelled to waive the immunity that attaches to his an-
swers. Id.
174. See Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990 (including Seventh Circuit recognition of the Fifth
Circuit rule). The Fifth Circuit's opinion of when immunity attaches has been criticized.
One commentator argues that immunity attaches as soon as an employee is faced with the
choice of answering, lying, or remaining silent. Bloch, supra note 146, at 669.
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III. THE DUTY To WARN RULE BEST ACCOMPLISHES THE TWIN AiMS
OF PROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND ALLOWING PUBLIC
EMPLOYERS TO TAKE ADVERSE ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYEES
A. The Rule Requiring an Affirmative Duty To Warn in Light of Miranda
and Garrity
The Supreme Court of California offers guidance on the protections af-
forded by the Fifth Amendment by analyzing Garrity in light of
Miranda.175 The purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination is to allow a suspect in any proceeding to re-
main silent in the face of hostile questioning, without penalty.176 The
Miranda Court was concerned that without adequate protection criminal
suspects would give statements that were not the product of free choice.'"
The Court's focus was finding the proper balance between the rights of
the individual and the need for the state to obtain information for crimi-
nal prosecution. Of paramount concern to the Court was protection of
the individual. 79
The Court in Garrity acknowledged that the basic principle upon which
Miranda rests is applicable to the questioning of public employees.'8
However, in its post-Garrity decisions, the Supreme Court established
that the protection afforded public employees is not as strong as that af-
forded in Miranda."' The exception that employees must answer narrow,
specific, and direct questions is based on the need to maintain public trust
in public employees and institutions, a concern not present in Miranda.
'
While Miranda provides a solid base for analysis, the unique policy con-
175. See Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 710 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). In
Lybarger, the Supreme Court of California recognized the similar purpose and effect of
Miranda and Garrity in effectively making a suspect/employee aware of his or her rights
under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
176. Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth
Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19,23-24 (2000).
177. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
178. See id. at 460.
179. Id.; see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (describing the
purposes and goals of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
180. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,497 (1967).
181. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968). But see Heard, supra
note 36, at 146 (commenting that the New York rule prohibiting anyone from interrogating
an officer suspected of wrongdoing on the job within forty-eight hours of the incident
extends protections to the officers greater than those offered by the Supreme Court in
Miranda).
182. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284
(1968). Of course, those answers are immune from later use in criminal prosecutions. Id.
at 284-85.
2007] 1063
Catholic University Law Review
siderations regarding public employment must be taken into account
when public employees are being questioned."'
B. The Seventh and Federal Circuit's Rule Best Balances the Need To
Protect Employees' Rights and Employers' Concerns
The Seventh Circuit's requirement that public employees be warned
most effectively balances the goals of Miranda while acknowledging the
unique role of public employees in society.'4 The court in Atwell articu-
lated the protections and prohibitions the rule affords both employees
and employers.lu The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit that
the employee does not have to be warned of his rights and duty to answer
until specifically questioned.'8 The court noted that an employee cannot
refuse to meet with his employer based on the fear that he may have to
give answers that may incriminate him."' Additionally, the Seventh Cir-
cuit allows employers to compel answers under the proper circum-
183. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806-08 (1977); see also Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 625 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[Plublic
employees, subject themselves to dismissal if they refuse to account for their performance
of their public trust .... ").
184. See Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990-91 (7th Cir. 2002). Put another
way, the three issues that need to be balanced in these situations are: the Fifth Amend-
ment rights of the public employee, the need for the public employer to effectively investi-
gate and take remedial action against an offending employee, and the need to keep crimi-
nal prosecutions open and effective. Clymer, supra note 38, at 1369-70.
185. See Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990-91. Another consideration in formulating a rule is to
examine the potential statements given by a public employee that could be used for inves-
tigations and in trial preparation, but not in the trial itself. Driscoll, supra note 7, at 141
(noting that some circuits allow use of coerced statements in trial preparation and in other
non-evidentiary situations, but not at a trial itself). Driscoll argues that if courts do not
address the question of non-evidentiary use, public employers and prosecutors have an
interest in preserving their use by ensuring that the statement does not come near a crimi-
nal prosecution. See id. at 142. Driscoll offers three suggestions to get around this prob-
lem. The first is to have one investigator focus on any pre-trial investigatory matters while
a second investigator or prosecutor focuses solely on the trial. Id. at 141. The first investi-
gator could withhold any statements that may have the taint of coercion attached, thus
preserving the integrity of the trial. Id. A second option is to allow the internal investiga-
tors employed by the public employer to invoke the public employee's Fifth Amendment
rights when the statement is subpoenaed. Id. at 141-42. Finally, Driscoll argues that public
employers could simply forego their investigation until any criminal prosecution of the
public employee has been resolved. Id. at 142. This would preserve any statements or
other evidence that could be obtained by interviewing the public employee. Id This op-
tion would also preserve both the criminal and administrative processes, protecting the
rights of the employee while assuring the public that everything has been done to root out
any offending employees. Id.
186. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 991. This follows because Garrity immunity does not attach
until a public employee is threatened with removal for failure to answer questions put to
him by his employer. See id. at 990-91.
187. Id. at 991.
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stances."' Allowing an employee to refuse to answer questions could
frustrate an employer's attempt to enforce relevant policies and rules.'89
Finally, an employer is permitted to ask non-incriminating questions
while investigating agency-wide malfeasance."90
Although these safeguards protect an employer's ability to investigate
any employee malfeasance, the warning requirement serves as a safe-
guard for employees. 9' Without it, employees will be unnecessarily left
uncertain with regard to their rights, just as criminal suspects would be
irreparably harmed if they were not informed of their right to remain
silent and the consequences of invoking or waiving that right.92 With this
rule in place, employees will know their rights and be able to make an
informed decision when asked incriminating questions."93
C. Applying the Duty To Warn Rule to Franklin: What the City of Evans-
ton Should Have Done
Edward Franklin was not advised of his rights and was subsequently
fired for refusing to answer questions posed to him by his employer.
4
Had the city followed the Seventh Circuit's rule, it would have had to
either warn Franklin of his immunity and duty to answer or continue the
188. Id. at 990. The Supreme Court has stated that there is "nothing unconstitutional
about forcing a state employee to answer questions relating to the performance of official
duties even if such questioning would result in job loss or other administrative sanctions."
Heard, supra note 36, at 141.
189. See Heard, supra note 36, at 137 (noting that a New York rule prohibiting interro-
gation of officers suspected in any on-duty incidents within forty-eight hours of the inci-
dent does not allow the department to protect the public effectively or investigate any
potential crime as thoroughly as possible).
190. See Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990-91. However, the Seventh and Fifth Circuits agree on
the need to give employers latitude to act and react. See id. at 991. It is this additional
safeguard that distinguishes the rule laid out by the Seventh Circuit from the rule laid out
by the Fifth Circuit. Compare id. at 990-91 (noting that there is no duty to warn until the
employer asks specific and narrow questions), with Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070,
1076 (5th Cir. 1982) (arguing that the warning rule "would allow an employee, before he or
she is required to respond to any questions, to circumvent an investigatory proceeding by
claiming generalized fifth amendment concerns" before those concerns have fully devel-
oped, thus preventing the employer from obtaining any relevant information from its em-
ployee).
191. See Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990.
192. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966); Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990.
193. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990-91. Professor Clymer argues that in order to balance the
tension inherent in encounters between employers and employees, legislators should at-
tempt to dictate and control situations where compelled statements might be taken, con-
trol the flow of and access to any compelled statement given, and attempt to formulate less
coercive measures to obtain information from public employees during administrative
interrogations. Clymer, supra note 38, at 1370.
194. Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838,842 (7th Cir. 2004).
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administrative process after the resolution of any criminal action.'9
Given Franklin's concern about self-incrimination, he likely would have
chosen to answer with the knowledge that his statements would be im-
munized.' 96 In Franklin's case, the result would have been very different
than what actually occurred.197 Criminal charges would likely not have
been filed, and Franklin's cooperation during the administrative proceed-
ing would have aided the internal investigation and given him a better
chance to retain his job. 98 As it was, Franklin needlessly lost his job be-
cause he was not given adequate warning of his options and duty to an-
swer.'99 Franklin is precisely the type of employee the court in Atwell
envisioned when it justified its rule on the need to protect employees
from themselves2'O
IV. CONCLUSION
When presented with the choice of whether to require public employ-
ers to warn their employees of their rights and duties during administra-
tive investigations, courts should adopt the warning requirement of the
Seventh and Federal Circuits. This rule is meant to protect employees
from making a detrimental choice regarding their employment. 20  The
rule also allows employers to provide this warning in a variety of ways
that are valid if the employee is warned of his duties and the conse-
195. Franklin v. City of Evanston, No. 99 C 8252, 2002 WL 31572137, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 19, 2002), rev'd in part, 2003 WL 1720006 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003), rev'd, 384 F.3d 838
(7th Cir. 2004). The city's failure to either continue the administrative discipline process at
a later date or warn Franklin of his rights meant that Franklin was not adequately given an
opportunity to defend himself against the allegations against him in both the criminal and
administrative proceedings. Id.
196. See Franklin, 384 F.3d at 842. But it is important to remember that what Franklin
might have said under a grant of immunity could be used against him in an administrative
investigation or administrative hearing. Heard, supra note 36, at 141 (noting that immu-
nized statements given during an administrative investigation can still be used in internal
disciplinary proceedings).
197. Cf. Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990 (noting that employees who have been made aware of
their rights are less likely to choose against their interests by invoking their Fifth Amend-
ment right to silence).
198. See Franklin, 384 F.3d at 842 (noting that the criminal charges against Franklin
were subsequently dropped). Franklin was the first employee to be fired under the city's
rule prohibiting possession of illegal drugs, despite the fact that other city employees had
run afoul of the law for driving under the influence. Id.
199. See id. (noting that Franklin was discharged mainly because he refused to answer
questions during a pre-disciplinary meeting because he was worried about his answers
being used in a potential criminal proceeding-something he should not have had to worry
about).
200. See Atwell, 286 F.3d at 990 (stating that the warning requirement is meant to pro-
tect employees from unknowingly acting against their interest).
201. Id. at 990-91.
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quences of refusing to answer narrowly directed questions.2M Finally, the
rule to warn follows better the rules of Garrity and Miranda and ad-
dresses the concerns stemming from those cases.2°3 Both Garrity and
Miranda read the Fifth Amendment as requiring the subject of an inter-
rogation to have a free and informed choice about whether he wants to
speak or remain silent.204 The Court has recognized that in both criminal
and administrative situations, there is a societal need for either the state
or an employer to obtain information, and the rule to warn protects that
principle while simultaneously informing an employee of his rights so
that he may make an informed decision regarding those rights. 5
202. See Weston v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 948 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (requiring the same standard as in Kalkines, and allowing the employer latitude in its
conveyance of the warning); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation,
426 F.2d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 1970) (requiring proper proceedings, namely, those where the
employee is advised of his choices and consequences); Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d
1391, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (requiring that an employee be duly advised according to the
standard in Uniformed Sanitation). But see Modrowski v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 252
F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (adopting the rule from Kalkines and Weston, but plac-
ing limits on the method of warnings so as to more fully protect employees).
203. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
204. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
205. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-
85 (1968); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. Because of the decreased individual interest in an
administrative setting (due to the difference in penalty between suspect employees and
criminals and the subject of the interrogation), Fifth Amendment concerns are lessened in
the administrative setting. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977). The
result is that the protections afforded the employee are not as strong as those afforded the
criminal suspect. See id. at 806-07.
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